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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings for piercing 
the corporate veil. The court's findings will be overturned only if they are clearly 
erroneous. Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962 P.2d 806 (Utah App. 1998). This 
issue was tried and argued in the Trial Memorandum of Paria Group and Stephen 
Zimmerman. R. 288 at 284, 3. 
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to enter judgment against PGM, Inc. or to 
pierce its corporate veil when there had been no service of process, PGM, Inc. had not 
entered an appearance, and PGM, Inc. was not named as a party in the lawsuit. The 
jurisdictional question is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 (Utah App. 1997). This issue was argued 
at trial (Tr. I, pp. 11,178)1 and in an objection to the judgment. R. 303. 
'The transcript was not numbered as part of the record. Proceedings of July 6, 1998 are 
contained in Volume I and individually numbered. Subsequent days proceedings are given new 
volume numbers and paginated from 1. Volume I is referred to herein as Tr. I, p. with the 
appropriate page number. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Paria Group commenced this case against Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd 
claiming violation of its leasehold right. Shortly thereafter, Westchester commenced 
an independent action against Paria Group and Stephen M. Zimmerman dba Paria 
Group claiming breach of the lease. The two actions were consolidated. Prior to trial, 
Paria moved out of the leased premises. The matter was tried to the court on July 6 
and 7 and August 18,1998. The court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order and Judgment November 18,1998. A Notice of Appeal was filed on 
December 10,1998. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Paria Group is a Utah corporation that was incorporated in 1989. Exhibit 18. 
Paria Group as tenant and Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd. as landlord entered 
into a written lease agreement which commenced May 1,1996 for a term of five years. 
Tr. I, p. 63. Stephen Zimmerman executed the lease agreement as president of Paria 
Group. Tr. I, p. 63. Paria Group violated the lease by vacating the premises and 
ceasing to pay rent. At the time of execution of the lease, in February of 1996, Paria 
Group had been involuntarily dissolved but was reinstated November 18,1996. Tr. I, 
p. 140. Stephen Zimmerman, president of Paria Group, became aware of the 
dissolution of the corporation through the litigation and caused its reinstatement. Tr. 
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1, p. 140,170. The shareholders were Carla Zimmerman and Jane Haynie. Tr. I, p. 
141. Stephen Zimmerman had owned stock in the corporation when it was organized 
but subsequently sold all of his stock. Tr. I, p. 171. 
PGM, Inc. is a Utah corporation that was incorporated in 1994. Tr. I, p. 170. 
In July of 1997, Paria Group sold its tangible assets to PGM, Inc. for a $600,000.00 
promissory note and security agreement. Tr. I, p. 143, Exhibits 89,90. By the time 
of trial over $500,000.00 had been paid on the note. Tr. I, p. 146-7. Paria Group was 
a research firm that did its own data collection. PGM, Inc. was a data collection firm. 
Tr. I, p. 169-70. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
No evidence showed that Stephen Zimmerman was the alter ego of either 
corporation, that Stephen Zimmerman dominated either corporation, that he 
commingled corporate and business funds, or any of the other criteria for piercing the 
corporate veil. There was no unity of interest or ownership. The evidence was not 
sufficient for the trial court to conclude as it did that the officers and directors were not 
properly chosen. The trial court erred in granting judgment piercing the corporate veil 
and entering judgment against Stephen Zimmerman. 
PGM, Inc. was not named as a party, was not served with process, and did not 
enter an appearance in this action. Under those circumstances, the trial court was 
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without personal jurisdiction over PGM, Inc. and could not properly enter judgment 
against it without violating its right to due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: There is no sufficient evidence to support the trial court's 
findings for piercing the corporate veil. 
Westchester produced the following evidence that may have some bearing on 
their claim to pierce the corporate veil: 
Rebecca McCune testified that she was employed by Paria, is currently 
employed by PGM and her work was basically the same for both. Tr. I, p. 39. 
Graham Triggs testified that he, Stephen Zimmerman, Rowan Schetter, and 
Lance Redford had all worked for Paria and now worked for PGM. Tr. I, p. 60. 
Stephen Zimmerman's testimony established that Paria Group had been 
involuntarily dissolved by August of 1996 when the lawsuit was filed and that it was 
reinstated November 18,1996. Tr. I, p. 140. He resigned as president of Paria Group 
in 1992. p. 144 and exhibit 85. He was asked "And you produced to me (Ms. 
Denning), didn't you, all of the minutes, the written minutes and documents, corporate 
documents, of Paria Group?" to which he responded "Yes." p. 145. Exhibit 88 
contains the corporate minutes which were produced and which show that Zimmerman 
was elected President of the corporation in April, 1995 and again in 1996 and 1997. 
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No question was ever asked as to whether there had been other meetings or other 
minutes or what happened to the minutes from other years or other meetings. 
Zimmerman's wife, Carla Zimmerman, was one of the shareholders of Paria Group. 
Zimmerman's testimony further establishes that Paria Group sold its ,isscl s I ml 
not its liabilities to PGM. Tr. *,
 F. ^ . fhat PGM had paid over $500,000.00 on the 
note by which it purchased the assets, p. 146-7. He later clarified that the assets sold 
included only equipment and not accounts receivable. ^ " ">. Zimmerman testified 
that he signed the note (exhibit 90) as president of PGM, Inc. and the Bill of Sale 
(exhibit 89) as president of Paria Group. Other documents established that Stephen 
Hill lllrll ( til 111 
Zimmerman, Stephen'swifr ' "' il ,i ilni/rlm nl 
Paria. Exhibits 84 and 87. 
Lance Redford testified that he worked for PGM, that he was Secretary of Paria 
Group, that he didn't recall signing minutes of either shareholder's or directors 
meetings, and that he recalled attending one meeting. Tr. I, p. 18. Documents 
establish that Redford was Paria's corporate secretai as reinstated in Il'' >< i 
v h i b i t 8 4 ) vvlu'ii il1. I ' ' ' " .IIIIIII.II k ' p n i l \ \ ; i s t i l ed 
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The requirements for piercing the corporate veil are clearly set forth in case law. 
Salt Lake Citv Corp. v James Constructors, Tnc. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988) 
summarizes the law. Public policy is to encourage commerce by insulating 
shareholders from the liabilities of corporations, at 46. "Courts must balance piercing 
and insulating policies and will only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate 
veil." at 46. The Court went on to state: "[I]n order to disregard the corporate entity, 
there must be a concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there must be such a unity of 
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is the alter ego of one or a few 
individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow." at 46, 7 quoting Norman v. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.. 596 P.2d 1028,1030 (Utah 1979). The first prong has 
been termed the formalities requirement, referring to corporate formalities. Salt Lake, 
at 47, quoting Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv.r Tnc. 678 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1984). 
The rationale behind the unity of interest prong is that if a principal shareholder 
or owner conducts his private and corporate business on an interchangeable or joint 
basis then third parties who have been affected have the right to do the same. Colman 
v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782,786 (Utah App. 1987). In that case, the unity of interest was 
found to exist because a principal shareholder did things in his own name rather than 
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the corporate name so that "time-consuming corporate resolutions" could be avoided 
and so that "corporate formalities could be avoided in selling stock." at 787. The 
Colman court also cited Lyons v. Lyons. .440 So Al I'd where a shareholder 
i unngled corporate corporate recuuls 01 minutes, .and 
•of file corporate income 787. 
In Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), this court reaffirmed 
that courts should be reluctant to pierce the corporation (at 1389) and upheld a 
summary judgment refusing to pierce the corporation where minutes of directors 
meetings, a corporate annual report, and corporate tax returns had been produced, at 
1390. 
ase there was u mat came close to meeting the standards -
forth in those cases. There icst The 
evidence of commingling of funds. The evidence showed that corpora4 formalit- -, 
were not ignored although no explanation was sought or offered by either party as to 
why the records were incomplete. There was no showing of a failure to file corporate 
tax returns. There was no evidence that the corporate entity was disregarded by 
personal M' assets or unilaterally acting in the corporate name. The trial court 
relied nil ml mi lln- |Ln I llnl nun minulc u i,:n mil |iiiirliiu'il illionuli in question 
was asked as to whether they existed), that the corporation was suspended for 
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of time for failure to file an annual report, that the two corporations had some common 
directors and officers, and that there was a market value sale of equipment from one 
corporation to the other for the sum of $600,000.00. 
The trial court in this case made several factual findings to support its conclusion 
that all actions of officers and directors may be voided and the corporate veil pierced 
(Conclusions of Law 12 & 13) which are not supported by the evidence: that the 
appointment of directors was not in accordance with the Bylaws of Paria Group 
(Finding of Fact 41), that the appointment of officers after May 30,1990 was not in 
accordance with the Bylaws of Paria Group (Finding of Fact 43), and that the directors 
who participated in the April 14,1995 meeting were not duly elected (Finding of Fact 
45). These findings appear to be based entirely on exhibit 88. Exhibit 88 contains 
some minutes of shareholders' meetings and some minutes of directors' meetings. No 
witness was ever asked whether other shareholders' meetings were held or whether 
other minutes had been made. No witness was ever asked how directors were chosen 
for the years when minutes were not produced. The trial court, apparently relying on 
the fact that some minutes were produced and others were not, jumped to the 
conclusion that the directors were not validly elected and therefore the officers were 
not duly elected. The evidence before the court did not show that the directors were 
not validly elected. Those findings are not supported by the evidence and cannot 
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support piercing the corporate veil under the standards of Norman v. Murray First 
Thrift & Loan Co.. supra. In Schafir v. Harrigan.supra. this court upheld summary 
judgment refusing to pierce the corporate veil when no minutes of shareholders 
meeting* \wu pniilm ed. 
Similarlyllie tiiuJinj1 thai "Steven (v/<) Zimmemr- « r, 
that non-stockholders voted him in as president" and that the Court would be assisting 
Zimmerman to promote an injustice if he were allowed to hide behind the corporate 
veil of Paria Group (Finding of Fact 59) are without support in the evidence. The only 
evidence relating to Stephen Zimmerman as a principal shareholder was that he had 
once owned shares, sold them, and now owned none. Tr. I, p. 141,171. There was 
evidence Ihil In , \\ lie wii ,i shareholder, but no evidence offered of how many shares 
she owned or that h mtrolle' 
not a principal shareholder. The lack of evidence regarding elections 
officers has already been discussed. The record is devoid of anything which suggests 
that failure to pierce the corporate veil would promote an injustice. Westchester 
obtained a money judgment. The evidence was that Paria Group was winding up its 
affairs and had $600,00 together with its accounts receivable with which to do it. 
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Finding of Fact 49 which states that the directors consent to Paria Group's 
purported transfer all of its assets, including computers, software, telephone 
equipment, and accounts receivable to PGM, Inc. was not signed by duly authorized 
directors, and that the bill of sale was not signed by a duly appointed officer is likewise 
unsupported by the evidence. The validity of the acts of the officers and directors has 
been dealt with. The only evidence as to what was transferred is Stephen 
Zimmerman's testimony and the documents which make it clear that accounts 
receivable were not included. Tr. I, p. 169. In addition, the same evidence makes it 
clear that the transfer was for full value. The finding (stated as Conclusion of Law 14) 
that the transfer of property by Paria to PGM was made with the actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud Mr. Zimmerman's and Paria Group's creditors is also clearly 
erroneous. There is no evidence from which to infer such an intent and a transfer for 
value cannot be fraudulent. 
The finding (stated as Conclusion of Law 15) that Paria Group and PGM, Inc. 
are controlled by Stephen Zimmerman and have been used as a shield to protect him 
from contractual debts and that Paria is undercapitalized to meet its obligations to 
Westchester are entirely without any support in the record. There was not one word 
of evidence from any witness which supports the conclusion that the corporations had 
been used in such a manner. Likewise there was no evidence offered that Paria would 
-10-
be unable to satisfy any judgment. Even if there had, to say that is grounds for piercing 
the corporate veil is to say that no shareholder is ever safe from a debt of a corporation 
in which he owns stock. 
Even more lacking than evidence that the corporate veil should be pierced is 
evidence that Stephen Zimmerman is liable if it were pierced. In none of the cases 
cited has any of the courts found that a non-shareholder was liable for the debts of the 
corporation. While one might imagine circumstances where that might be appropriate, 
no such circumstances were shown here. Not one word of evidence was ever offered 
that Stephen Zimmerman benefitted in any way from any acts of either corporation. 
Not one word of evidence was ever offered mat Stephen Zimmerman unilaterally made 
decisions for the corporations. Not one word of evidence was offered that Stephen 
Zimmerman's funds were commingled with corporate funds or that corporate funds 
were used by Zimmerman. 
Based on a complete lack of evidence to meet the standards of Utah law, this 
court should reverse the trial court's findings relating to the piercing of the corporate 
veil and remand the matter to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of Zimmerman that he is not liable for the debt of Paria to Westchester. 
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POINT II: The trial court had no jurisdiction to enter judgment against 
PGM, Inc. or to pierce its corporate veil. 
The record in this matter is clear that PGM, Inc. was not named as a party, was 
not served with process, and did not appear in the action. The United States Supreme 
Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v Hazeltine Research, Tnc. 395 U.S. 100, 89 S.Ct. 1562 
(1969), stated mat it is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment from litigation 
in which he is not designated as a party and has not been served, at 1569. In that case, 
Zenith Radio had acquired licenses to use the patented devices of a company referred 
to as HRI. HRI was a wholly owned subsidiary of Hazeltine. When the licenses 
expired, Zenith continued to use the devices without renewing the licenses claiming 
the licenses were no longer required. HRI filed suit claiming patent infringement and 
Zenith counterclaimed claiming violation of the Sherman Act. The district court ruled 
in favor of Zenith and entered judgment against HRI as well as Hazeltine. Judgment 
against Hazeltine was based on a stipulation signed by HRI that HRI and Hazeltine 
were to be considered one entity. 
In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
Perhaps Zenith could have proved and the trial court might have 
found that HRI and Hazeltine were alter egos; but absent jurisdiction 
over Hazeltine, that determination would bind only HRI. If the alter ego 
issue had been litigated, and if the trial court had decided that HRI and 
Hazeltine were one and the same entity and that jurisdiction over HRI 
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gave the court jurisdiction over Hazeltine, perhaps Hazeltine's 
appearance before judgment with full opportunity to contest jurisdiction 
would warrant entry of judgment against it. But that is not what occurred 
here. The trial court's judgment against Hazeltine was based wholly on 
HRI's stipulation. HRI may have executed the stipulation to avoid 
litigating the alter ego issue, but this fact cannot foreclose Hazeltine, 
which has never had its day in court on the question of whether it and its 
subsidiary should be considered the same entity for the purposes of this 
litigation. 
Likewise, were it shown that Hazeltine, through its officer, Dodds, 
in fact controlled the litigation on behalf of HRI, and if the claim were 
made that the judgment agaisnt HRI would be res judicata against 
Hazeltine because of this control, that claim itself could be finally 
adjudicated against Hazeltine only in a court with jurisdiction over that 
company. 
Id. at 1570 (citations omitted). Thus according to the United States Supreme Court, 
a decision regarding the alter ego status of various persons or entities is binding only 
on the parties actually named and served in the action. 
The trial court's judgment, to the extent that it purports to grant judgment 
against PGM, Inc. or to be binding on PGM, Inc. in any way is clearly void for lack 
of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The record has no substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that 
the corporate veils of Paria Group and PGM, Inc. should be pierced. It is devoid of 
evidence that Stephen Zimmerman should be hable if the veils were pierced. The trial 
court was without jurisdiction to make any judgment binding on PGM, Inc. The 
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judgment should be reversed as to Zimmerman and PGM, Inc. and the matter should 
be remanded for the trial court to enter judgment in fevor of Zimmerman on the claims 
of piercing the corporate veil and to strike from the judgment anything relating to 
PGM, Inc.. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ L _ day of Apr*, 1999. 
.John G. Mulliner' 
( Attorney for Appellees 
Mailing Certificate 
Ay 
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1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
2. Order and Judgment 
-15-
Cameron S. Denning (6863) 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
PARIA GROUP, a Utah : 
corporation, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
v. : Civil No. 960400573 
WESTCHESTER INVESTMENT : Judge Howard Maetani 
PARTNERS, LTD., : 
Defendant. : 
—oooOooo— 
WESTCHESTER INVESTMENT : 
PARTNERS, LTD., : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
PARIA GROUP, a dissolved Utah : 
corporation, and STEPHEN M. : 
ZIMMERMAN, an individual, dba : 
PARIA GROUP, : 
Defendants. : 
—oooOooo— 
0326 
The above-referenced consolidated cases came on for trial before the above-entitled Court, 
the Honorable Howard Maetani presiding, on July 6 and 7,1998, and August 18,1998. Paria Group 
and Stephen M. Zimmerman were present and represented by their counsel, John G. Mulliner; 
Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd. through its principal, D.M. Properties, Inc. and Daniel A. 
Miller, was present and represented by its counsel, Cameron S. Denning. The Court, having heard 
the testimony of the witnesses and the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the exhibits, files, 
and records herein, and being fully advised in the premises, and having issued its Memorandum 
Decision dated October 27, 1998, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Paria Group, by and through its president, Stephen M. Zimmerman, and Westchester 
Investment Partners, Ltd. entered into a lease agreement ("the Lease") in February, 1996, whereby 
Paria Group agreed to lease suites 4000 and 120 in the Central Park East office building located at 
1815 South State Street, Orem, Utah (the "leased premises"). (Exhibit No. 1.) 
2. The leased premises are owned by Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd., and managed 
by D.M. Properties. 
3. The 5-year lease term began on May 1,1996, and provided for rentpayments of $8,848.75 
per month in the first year, increasing incrementally throughout the lease term. {Id.) 
4. The lease also contained an addendum ("the Addendum") consisting of nine (9) numbered 
paragraphs. (Exhibit 2.) The use of such an addendum is not usual in Westchester's leasing practice, 
but is used when Westchester has particular concerns about a tenant's occupancy which must be 
separately negotiated and addressed. 
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5. During the lease negotiations, the parties discussed Paria Group's hours of operation and 
negotiated and agreed upon f 1 of the Addendum, which provides: 
1. Lessee represents that its hours of operation shall be limited to 7:00 a.m. 
to 10:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, and 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, and 
no hours on Sunday, with the exception of certain limited occasions when Lessee 
needs to service its overseas clients. Any hours of operation beyond the above 
specified shall be deemed a material default of the lease, unless specifically approved 
in writing by Lessor. (Id.) 
6. During the lease negotiations, the parties also discussed allotted parking, parking location, 
and parking supervision for Paria, and negotiated and agreed upon on the provisions of Tf6 of the 
Addendum, which provides: 
6. Between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., Lessee shall have the use of not 
more than 40 parking spaces in the east parking lot, with such spaces to be designated by 
Lessor, and which designation Lessor may change from time to time. Lessee shall instruct 
its employees and agents to park in the designated area, and be responsible for supervising 
compliance therewith. After 6:00 p.m. and on Saturdays, Lessee may use additional parking 
spaces, provided such parking use does not interfere with the parking needs of other tenants 
in Central Park East and Central Park West office buildings. 
Lessee agrees and understands that the use of more than 40 parking spaces, between 
7:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, will materially adversely effect the parking 
rights of other tenants and Lessee's failure to comply with the parking provisions of this 
Addendum shall be considered a material default of this lease. Further, any costs incurred 
by Lessor in enforcing any violation by Lessee of the parking provision of this Addendum, 
such as hiring a security guard, shall be reimbursed by Lessee to Lessor. (Id.) 
1. During the negotiation of the Lease, Mr. Zimmerman represented (i) that 40 parking 
spaces would be adequate based upon his examination of parking at his former place of business 
and based upon the number of employees he represented would be present at any one time, and 
(ii) that Paria had no parking difficulties at its former location. 
3 
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8. Mr. Zimmerman also represented to Westchester during the lease negotiations, (i) that 
his company only worked outside its regular business hours "on certain limited occasions," and 
(ii) that the maximum number of employees on the premises at any one time would be 85, 
including management staff. 
9. Daniel A. Miller and D.M. Properties, Inc., for Westchester, reasonably relied on Mr. 
Zimmerman's representations and promises in agreeing to lease the premises to Paria Group. 
10. Paria Group took possession of the leased premises on or about May 1, 1996. 
11. Immediately thereafter, employees of Paria Group began parking in areas other than 
the east parking lot, and began using more than 40 parking spaces in the building's parking areas, 
and interfering with other tenants' parking in the parking lot. 
12. On several occasions in May, 1996, Daniel A. Miller telephoned Paria Group 
representatives to express his concern, and that of other tenants of the property, about the parking 
and safety problems, and requested that Paria conform to the provisions of 16 of the Addendum, 
including providing adequate parking supervision. 
13. In late May, 1996, Daniel A. Miller met with Stephen M. Zimmerman to discuss the 
overloading of the parking lot. Mr. Miller suggested that Paria Group lease parking space outside 
the office complex and, if necessary, shuttle employees in, or use parking monitors, or find other 
parking near the premises. (Exhibit No. 68.) 
14. Despite these requests, Paria Group did not take immediate action to remedy the 
parking problems. As a result, the problems continued. 
4 
0323 
15. On June 5, 1996, Mr. Miller notified Paria Group that Westchester was hiring parking 
monitors to regulate the parking situation, and that it expected reimbursement from Paria pursuant 
to the provisions of the Lease and Addendum. (Exhibit No. 68.) 
16. The parking monitors hired by Westchester began working in the Central Park parking 
lot on June 10, 1998. 
17. The first invoice from the parking monitors, K&M International, was forwarded to 
Paria Group on June 25, 1996. (Exhibits No. 9 and 10.) 
18. Paria Group requested, in a July 1, 1996, letter (Exhibit No. 11) documentation of 
the parking monitor's findings, which documentation was provided by Westchester in a letter 
dated July 3, 1996. (Exhibit No. 75). Paria Group neither followed up directly with K&M 
International, who provided the parking monitoring (as invited to by Westchester), nor made any 
subsequent request for documentation. 
19. Subsequent invoices from K&M International were similarly forwarded to Paria 
Group. 
20. Paria Group never reimbursed Westchester its costs incurred for supervising the 
parking, which total $6,892.84 (Exhibit No. 95.) 
21. The parking problems did not exist prior to Paria's occupancy of the leased premises, 
and ceased to exist after Paria vacated the premises. 
22. Paragraph 19(i) and (iii) of the Lease required the Lessor to send to the Lessee written 
notice of failure to pay rent or perform any provision of the Lease. 
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23. Westchester delivered to Paria Group several Notices to Pay Rent or Quit concerning 
the unpaid parking expenses. (See, for example, Exhibit 13.) 
24. Westchester also forwarded Notices to Perform or Quit the Premises concerning (i) 
the parking violations and (ii) the fact that the back door of the building was being left unlocked. 
(Exhibit No. 14.) 
25. Westchester also claimed that Paria employees interfered with other tenants' use of 
the premises by loitering in the halls, blocking the hallways, and interfering with other tenants' 
ingress and egress down the halls, blocking the rear door of the building open during the night, 
and driving recklessly and carelessly through the parking areas and interfering with other tenants' 
ingress and egress to the parking lot. Paria employees loitered in and took breaks in the private 
lobby comprising Vinca Corporation's leased premises. 
26. Paria employees (i) frequently worked 24 hours a day, six days a week, and (ii) 
frequently worked after 10:00 p.m. during other periods. Written permission for those excess 
hours was not obtained from Westchester. This excess usage resulted in increased maintenance 
and operational costs, increased wear and tear, and increased security risks for the building and 
for other tenants. 
27. In late summer, 1997, Paria began moving from the leased premises. 
28. Paria's vacation of the premises occurred without notice to Westchester. 
29. At about the same time, Westchester filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
which was pending before the Court. 
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30. The parties entered into a Stipulation in mid-September, 1997, which provided that 
(i) Paria Group would completely vacate the premises on or before September 30, 1997; (ii) 
Westchester would withdraw its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and (iii) all claims 
between the parties would be reserved for future determination. 
31. Westchester's actions concerning parking supervision and the sending of Notices to 
pay rent and/or perform or quit the premises were taken in conformance with the provisions of 
the lease, including f 19 thereof, and were not "willful, intentional and malicious." 
32. During the relevant time period, State Street, contiguous with Central Park, was a 
public thoroughfare open to public parking. 
33. Westchester complained to Paria that employee parking on State Street created a 
hazard in exiting the Central Park parking lot. 
34. In an effort to be accommodating, Paria instructed its employees not to park on State 
Street in front of Central Park. 
35. Westchester served Paria with a Notice to Perform or Quit based on a claim that Paria 
employees were parking on State Street next to Central Park. 
36. Westchester had no good faith basis for claiming Paria was in default for preventing 
parking on State Street because State Street is a public street and beyond Westchester's control. 
37. Westchester has incurred damages as a result of Paria's breaches of the lease as 
follows: 
(a) parking enforcement costs - $6,892.84 (Exhibit 95); 
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(b) rent through July 1, 1998, plus utilities, interest and late charges - $126,579.03 
(Exhibit 97), plus rent accruing for August and September, 1998, in the amount of $9,968.76 per 
month, for a total of $146,516.54; 
(c) costs of preparing premises for a new tenant - $16,886.92 (Exhibit 96); 
(d) costs of preparing the premises for Paria's occupancy and leasing the premises 
to Paria of $56,344.59, of which Westchester may be reimbursed for the pro-rated amount of 
$41,319.37 which is equal to the months remaining on the lease after Paria's vacation. (Exhibit 
98); 
(e) costs of court - $755.85; and 
00 reasonable attorney's fees - $32,625.30 (See revised Attorney's Fee Affidavit 
dated September 10, 1998, amended to include time and fees incurred for trial). 
38. VINCA Corporation, Westchester's largest tenant at Central Park East, had been 
looking for a new location for a year prior to the problems with Paria employees. Vinca gave 
notice that it would not renew its lease with Westchester after December 1, 1998, when it 
naturally expired. Though the situation with Paria was frustrating, it was not the deciding factor 
in Vinca's decision to relocate. Vinca decided to move based on negotiations for a location at 
WordPerfect Campus in Orem, Utah, which came completely furnished. Vinca felt this 
opportunity could not be bypassed. 
39. Article II, Section 1 of the Bylaws of Paria Group require annual meetings of the 
shareholders for the purpose of electing directors (Exhibit No. 88.) 
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40. There is no evidence that any shareholders meetings of Paria Group were held after 
May 30, 1990 (Exhibit No. 88.) 
41. The appointment of directors of Paria Group elected after May 30, 1990, was not in 
accordance with the Bylaws of Paria Group. 
42. Article III of the Bylaws of Paria Group requires that the officers of Paria Group be 
appointed by duly elected directors (Exhibit No. 88.) 
43. The appointment of officers of Paria Group after May 30, 1990, was not in 
accordance with the Bylaws of Paria Group. 
44. Stephen M. Zimmerman tendered his resignation as president of Paria Group on April 
10, 1992 (Exhibit No. 85.) 
45. Although minutes of the Paria Group Board of Directors meeting dated April 14, 
1995, purport to appoint Mr. Zimmerman as president, the directors who participated in the April 
14, 1995 meeting were not duly elected (Exhibit No. 88.) 
46. Additionally, when Paria Group executed the lease with Westchester in February, 
1996, it was not a corporation in good standing with the state of Utah and had been involuntarily 
dissolved (Exhibit No. 87.) 
47. Carla Zimmerman, wife of Stephen Zimmerman, is a shareholder of Paria Group. 
48. No dividends have ever been paid from Paria Group. Mrs. Zimmerman has never 
received any dividend payments. 
49. In July, 1997, Paria Group purported to transfer all of its assets, including computers, 
software, telephone equipment, and accounts receivable to an entity known as PGM, Inc. Paria 
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Group's directors' consent for such transfer was not signed by duly authorized directors. The bill 
of sale executed by Paria Group in connection with the purported transfer was not signed by a 
duly appointed officer of Paria Group (Exhibit No. 88.) 
50. Paria Group did not transfer any of its liabilities and accounts payable to PGM, Inc. 
51. Stephen Zimmerman and Carla Zimmerman, his wife, are the directors of PGM, Inc. 
52. At the time the transfer was made, PGM was a dissolved Utah corporation, having 
failed to file its annual reports with the state of Utah. PGM was reinstated on August 13, 1997. 
Exhibit 84. 
53. At the time it occupied the leased premises, Paria Group engaged in the business of 
telephone market research. 
54. PGM, Inc. is also engaged in the business of telephone market research. 
55. A majority of the employees of Paria Group transferred to PGM when Paria Group 
vacated the leased premises and began to do business as PGM, Inc. in September, 1997. 
56. Paria Group ceased doing business in September, 1997. 
57. Paria attempted to prove that it was justified in leaving the premises because 
Westchester engaged in "wilful, intentional, and malicious" actions intended to harass Paria. 
Amended Complaint 18, filed November 7, 1996. Paria claimed that Westchester undertook "a 
pattern of harassment" which included detaining employees, guests, and customers when they 
attempted to use the parking lots, following female employees around the parking lots, and serving 
Paria with unfounded notices to quit. Paria claims these actions "deprived Plaintiff [Paria] of its 
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peaceful enjoyment of its leased premises." Id. By making these claims to justify its vacating the 
premises, Paria is arguing constructive eviction even though it has not stated that cause of action. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted American Jurisprudence's definition of "constructive 
eviction" in Thirteenth and Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847, 850 (Utah 1953) as 
"interference with the tenant's enjoyment of the demised premises . . . of a substantial nature and 
so injurious as to deprive him of the beneficial enjoyment of a part or the whole of the demised 
premises." According to Neslen, two elements are necessary for constructive eviction: (1) the 
tenant's possession must be disturbed by the landlord or his agent, which renders the premises 
unfit for the purpose for which it was occupied; and (2) the tenant must abandon the premises 
within a reasonable time. Id. 
Paria failed to meet the elements for constructive eviction under Neslen. Paria may have 
been disturbed by the actions of Westchester, but those actions became necessary only after Paria 
failed to abide by the terms of the lease. Furthermore, Paria failed to show how monitoring 
parking rendered the premises unfit for the purpose for which it was leased. Finally, Westchester 
began to complain and take corrective action regarding parking violations within weeks after Paria 
moved into the premises in May 1996. Paria did not move out until sixteen months later in 
September 1997. Sixteen months does not meet the reasonable time requirement under Utah law. 
58. Paria claims that Westchester accepted surrender of the premises, which should 
extinguish any claim for rent after Paria's vacation. Surrender requires either a written notice 
from the landlord that the landlord wished to terminate the lease, or that a court must decree under 
the common-law doctrine of "surrender and acceptance" that the landlord had terminated. The 
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tenant bears the burden of proof on this issue. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, 116 P.2d 896, 901 
(*\Utah 1989). Westchester did not send notice that it wished to terminate the lease. Instead the 
parties stipulated that Paria would leave by September 30, 1997, in return for which Westchester 
would withdraw its motion for Summary Judgment then pending before the Court. The stipulation 
could have been considered written notice that Westchester intended to terminate the lease, but 
it also contained language that preserved all claims, rights, and remedies under the lease for 
further consideration. Under the stipulation, Westchester is able to recover the rent accruing for 
the remaining term of the lease, subject to mitigation. The Court finds that the stipulation entered 
into by both parties allowed Paria to leave the premises before the lease term ended, and allows 
Westchester to ask for accruing rents, damages and attorney fees. 
59. Westchester presented evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil. "Ordinarily, 
a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity from its stockholders." Dockstader 
v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973). Courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil and hold 
individual stockholders liable. Two situations must exist before courts will consider piercing the 
corporate veil: (1) Such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one 
or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice, or result in an inequity. Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1029, 
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1030 (Utah 1979). Actual fraud need not be shown, but only that failure to breach the corporate 
veil would result in an injustice. Accord United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. 
And Rehabilitation Center. Inc., 511 F.Supp. 416 (D. Calif 1982). 
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Factors that are considered significant in determining whether failure to breach the 
corporate veil would result in an injustice include: (1) under capitalization of a one-man 
corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) 
siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunctioning of other officers 
or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the corporation as a facade for 
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in 
promoting injustice or fraud. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1987). 
Evidence was presented to show that Steven Zimmerman was a principal stockholder, that non-
stockholders voted him in as president, and that Paria Group transferred assets to PGM, Inc. but 
not liabilities or accounts payable. The Court would be assisting Zimmerman to promote an 
injustice if he were allowed to hide behind the corporate veil of Paria Group. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Paria Group breached its lease with Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd. by its failure 
to comply with the provisions of f 1 of the Addendum by working outside its regular business 
hours on more than "certain limited occasions" without first obtaining permission from, the lessor. 
2. Paria Group breached its lease with Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd., by its failure 
to comply with 1 6 of the Addendum in the following respects: 
(a) parking in areas other than those designated by the lessor as Paria parking; 
(b) using more than forty (40) parking spaces in the building's parking areas; 
(c) interfering with the parking needs and rights of other tenants; 
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(d) failing to adequately supervise its employees with regard to the parking 
provisions of the Addendum; and 
(e) failing to reimburse the landlord for costs incurred to enforce the parking 
provisions of the addendum. 
3. Paria Group breached its lease with Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd., by its 
failure to comply with 15 of the Lease in the following respects: 
(a) Obstructing and interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the premises by the 
other tenants of the building; 
(b) allowing its employees to drive carelessly and recklessly in the parking areas 
of the building; 
(c) allowing its employees to impede the safe and adequate ingress and egress to 
the building and parking areas by other tenants; 
(d) interfering with the parking rights and requirements of other tenants; 
(e) allowing its employees to loiter in the reception areas of other tenants, in the 
halls and common areas of the building, and to block the building hallways; 
(f) creating security risks for other tenants by blocking open the doors to the 
building after regular working hours; 
(g) allowing an excessive number of employees at its leased premises; and 
(h) using common areas of the building to conduct its training sessions. 
4. Paria Group breached 11 9 and 19 of its lease with Westchester Investment Partners, 
Ltd., by abandoning and vacating the premises prior to expiration of the lease term. 
14 
5. Paria Group breached 11 3 and 19 of its lease with Westchester Investment Partners, 
Ltd., by its failure and refusal to pay rent becoming due under the lease. 
6. Paria Group breached 1 3 of the Rules and Regulations which were part of the lease 
agreement in the following respects: 
(a) allowing its employees to loiter in common areas and passageways of the 
building and to obstruct the use of the same by other building tenants; 
(b) allowing its employees to obstruct and block open the doors of the building after 
regular work hours; and 
(c) using common areas of the building, including the patio/deck, to conduct its 
training sessions. 
7. Each of the foregoing breaches of the lease and/or addendum are material breaches and 
defaults. 
8. Westchester gave all notices for breach of provisions of the Lease and/or Addendum 
to Paria Group in writing, as required by the Lease. 
9. Paria Group is liable for damages incurred by Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd. 
for parking enforcement in the amount of $6,892.84, for rent, utilities, interest and late charges 
in the amount of $146,516.54 through September 1, 1998, and for the costs of preparing the 
property for Paria's occupancy, in the amount of $41,319.37, a pro-rated amount equal to the 
remaining lease period. 
10. In addition, Westchester is entitled to damages incurred in preparing the premises for 
a new tenant, in the amount of $16,866.92. [Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 
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(Utah 1989): "[Cjosts reasonably incurred in readying the property and in reletting or attempting 
to relet [are] added to the amount recoverable from the breaching tenant." These costs include 
the expenses incurred in seeking new tenants and also costs of repairs or alterations of the 
premises reasonably necessary to successfully relet them. 776 P.2d 907.] 
11. The Court retains jurisdiction to enter further damage awards, including additional 
rent accruing through the end of the lease period, the cost of re-leasing and refurbishing the space, 
and other damages incurred by the landlord, subject to Westchester's reasonable mitigation 
efforts. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 908-09 (Utah 1989). 
12. Inasmuch as, after May 1, 1990, directors were not elected by the shareholders 
pursuant to Paria's Bylaws, any subsequent election of officers by the directors is null and void, 
and actions taken by directors and officers after the terms of directors elected on May 1, 1990, 
expired, may be voided. 
13. The corporate veils of Paria Group and PGM, Inc. are pierced and Stephen M. 
Zimmerman is held personally liable and responsible for all amounts owed to Westchester. 
14. The transfer of property by Paria to PGM was made with actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud Mr. Zimmerman's and Paria Group's creditors. Accordingly, the transfer of 
property is avoided to the extent necessary to satisfy Westchester's judgment in this matter. Utah 
Code Ann. §§25-6-5, 25-6-8; Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526 (Utah 1973); Colman v. 
Colman, 143 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); and Chatterly v. Omnico, Inc., 485 P.2d 667 (Utah 
1971). 
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15. Paria Group and PGM, Inc. are controlled by Stephen M. Zimmerman and have been 
used as a shield to protect him from contractual debts. Necessary corporate records are missing, 
no dividends have been paid, meetings of shareholders have not been held, Paria is 
undercapitalized to meet its obligations to Westchester, and failure to pierce the corporate veils 
would promote injustice against Westchester. Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526 (Utah 1973); 
Colman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
16. The transfer of assets to PGM, Inc. was not made by duly authorized and elected 
directors and officers of Paria Group and is therefore rescinded and made null and void to the 
extent necessary to satisfy Westchester's judgment in this matter. A constructive trust is imposed 
on the assets of PGM, Inc. to the extent necessary to satisfy Westchester's judgment. Restatement 
of Restitution §160 (1959); Restatement of Trusts §1 (1957). 
17. No action taken by Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd. constitutes harassment or 
constructive eviction. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989); Brugger 
v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (Utah 1982). Paria Group's claims in this regard are therefore to be 
dismissed. 
18. Additionally, Paria Group's constructive eviction claim fails because it did not vacate 
the premises within a reasonable time of the actions of which it complains. Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 116 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989); Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (Utah 1982). 
19. There was no waiver by Westchester of any rights under the lease or any of its claims 
set forth in this action, and Paria Group could not have relied on any waiver of rights in vacating 
the premises. 
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20. Pursuant to the parties' lease, Westchester is entitled to recover its reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in these cases. 
21. Judgment shall be entered dismissing Paria's claims and awarding damages to 
Westchester totaling $211,595.67 through September 1,1998, prejudgment interest, costs of coun 
in the amount of $755.85, and attorney's fees of $32,625.30, for a total judgment of $244,976.82, 
with interest at the legal rate until paid in full. 
22. Further, a constructive trust in favor of Westchester is imposed on the assets of PGM. 
Inc. to satisfy Westchester's judgment in this matter. 
DATED this / ? day of A/0l/€/"4't?®9&. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOWARDN^AFTANI 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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PARIA GROUP, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WESTCHESTER INVESTMENT 
PARTNERS, LTD., 
Defendant. 
ORDER and JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960400573 
Judge Howard Maetani 
—oooOooo— 
WESTCHESTER INVESTMENT 
PARTNERS, LTD., 
Plaintiff, 
PARIA GROUP, a dissolved Utah 
corporation, and STEPHEN M. 
ZIMMERMAN, an individual, dba 
PARIA GROUP, 
Defendants. 
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The above-referenced consolidated cases came on for trial before the above-entitled Court, 
the Honorable Howard Maetani presiding, on July 6 and 7,1998, and August 18,1998. Paria Group 
and Stephen M. Zimmerman were present and represented by their counsel, John G. Mulliner; 
Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd. through its principal, D.M. Properties, Inc. and Daniel A. 
Miller, was present and represented by its counsel, Cameron S. Denning. The Court, having heard 
the testimony of the witnesses and the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the exhibits, files, 
and records herein, and being fully advised in the premises, and having issued its Memorandum 
Decision dated October 27,1998, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. Paria's claims against Westchester are dismissed, no cause of action; 
2. Westchester is awarded judgment against Paria Group, PGM. Inc., and Stephen M. 
Zimmerman, jointly and severally, for damages totaling $211,595.67 through September 1, 1998, 
costs of court in the amount of $755.85, and attorney's fees of $32,625.30, for a total judgment of 
$244,976.82, with interest at the legal rate until paid in full. 
3. The Court retains jurisdiction for the entry of future damages awards and attorney's fees 
in favor of Westchester and against Paria, PGM, and Zimmerman as damages, including rent, 
continue to accrue under the parties' lease, subject to mitigation; and 
4. A constructive trust in favor of Westchester is imposed on the assets of PGM, Inc., and 
its successors and assigns, to satisfy Westchester's judgment in this matter, and Westchester shall 
be entitled to levy upon those assets to the extent necessary to satisfy this judgment. 
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DATED this //f day of AJ(><tC4#4*U< 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
fe^^< 
OWARDfl^A^TANI 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, to John G. Mulliner, attorney for Defendant, at P.O. Box 1045, Provo, Utah 
84603. 
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DATED: H^V* j ^ , 1998. 
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